

“The failure of the Government’s post-war productivity programme can be laid at the door of the Trades Union Congress and the union movement in general.” Assess this statement in the light of your reading of the Labour Government’s relationship with the trade unions and the employers.

The electorate at the 1945 General Election placed the post-war reconstruction of Britain in the hands of a pro-interventionist Labour government. Partly out of economic necessity and part philosophy Labour continued with state regulation to promote industrial output, government was therefore drawn into the field of industrial politics occupied by capital and labour. Britain was near bankrupt, every channel to increase manufacturing output particularly for export was explored, Labour’s pledge was to bring industry into the service of the nation ‘this means that industry must be thoroughly efficient.’¹ An essential element in Labour’s policy was its relationship with the trade union movement, particularly the leadership who firmly believed that the administration of Clement Attlee was ‘their’ government.² If it can be said that the productivity programme failed because of the Trade Union Congress (TUC), then it would also be true to say that the programme failed because of the government, because the two were relatively indivisible.

The productivity question was raised with the experience of war. War with its demands to squeeze more production from the mixture of capital and labour when other ingredients were in suspension raised the debate to one of national survival. In a well-publicised debate, Correlli Barnett pointed out that despite extensive bombing productivity in Germany was twenty per cent higher than in Britain. Because of mediocre technical education, low capital investment and poor industrial relations it took 4,000

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man-hours to produce a Messerschmitt and 13,000 for a Spitfire.³ In 1941 in a perceived production crisis that suggested that output was forty per cent below what was thought possible led the state to become involved in production because of the necessities of war.⁴ The wartime coalition government required shop floor co-operation and for the first time the trade union movement was brought into the heart of government.⁵ The most striking example was Ernest Bevin, the General Secretary of the Transport Workers Union (TGWU) who became Minister of Labour.

At a plant level, Joint Production Committees (JPCs) were formed voluntarily from both management and workers, although opinion indicates that ‘managerial weakness and worker motivation were the keys to higher productivity.’⁶ JPCs aimed at involving workers in production decisions and some of the most enthusiastic and motivated participants were Communist shop stewards eager to increase production to defeat fascism.⁷ It has been suggested that anti-communist trade union leaders adopted an antipathetic attitude to JPCs because they gave prominence to workplace communists.⁸

Evidence would appear to suggest that employers were less keen than their workers to discuss reciprocal methods to increase production.⁹ The coalition government took the lead, Ministries controlled by Labour politicians like Stafford Cripps led the way and the Ministry of Production formed an advisory service to assist with issues such as designing and improving production layout to rate fixing.¹⁰ By December 1942, over 2,000 JPCs had

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been constituted covering over two million workers. In 1943 the Engineering Union (AEU) noted that the JPCs have ‘fully justified their existence and have proved themselves a factor of incalculable value to the war effort.’¹¹

For the trade unionists who sat down with management for the first time to discuss issues of mutual concern the concept must have been novel. Mass unemployment in the 1930s had contributed to a weak position for the trade unions and they could be ignored. Now they were being asked to make a contribution of such significance that ‘never before or since has there been such an extensive role of workers and trade unions in production decisions at factory level.’¹²

Jim Tomlinson has argued that the attitude of employers to the JPCs is uncertain although for whatever reason they did co-operate with the system.¹³ However, the evidence presented by Tomlinson on government promotion of JPCs does imply some degree of state coercion. The state had imposed wartime controls and employers working to armaments or military contracts had little leeway.¹⁴ How successful the JPCs were at improving productivity overall remains inconclusive although Tomlinson cites Stafford Cripps the President of the Board of Trade as saying that they made ‘a significant contribution to the war’s effort’.¹⁵ The literature generally assumes that trade unions considered JPCs a good thing, but Robert Currie suggests that workers found it very difficult to adjust to class collaboration.¹⁶

The Labour party’s avid promotion of industrial efficiency and greater production had its roots in the shibboleth of nationalisation held since the party took a philosophical stance in 1918.¹⁷ The party was the political wing of the trade unions, which at this stage were at the pinnacle of domination, the policy was therefore the will of the trade union movement. The TUC for its part did consider productivity in a wider context than public ownership when it met leading industrialists in the Mond-Tuner talks of 1927-28.¹⁸ The debate within British mainstream socialist thought however, pre dates 1918. Industrial efficiency and socialism were inseparable according to Ramsey MacDonald, socialism would reward workers effort and would ‘not be a menace to labour, but a direct and certain cause of more leisure and comfort.’¹⁹

The election of Labour in 1945 was also a victory for the policies of the TUC.²⁰ The nullification of the 1927 Trades Dispute Act was an immediate goal that Labour quickly acted upon to restore the union freedoms from legal constraint.²¹ In another sign of the close relationship, union General Secretary, George Issacs of the print workers, filled the vacancy at the Ministry of Labour caused by Bevin’s promotion to Foreign Secretary. Although the TUC wanted a return to the tradition of voluntarism and free collective bargaining, it also wished to have a ‘decisive share in the actual control of the economic life of the nation’ particularly so as not to prejudice full employment.²²

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In 1947, the economy deteriorated and inflation became a pressing issue for the government. Union members demanded higher wages and reduced hours of work. The Labour government including Cripps and Aneurin Bevan supported a wages policy as an element of socialist planning.²³ Alan Booth has argued that the government took the opportunity to raise the productivity issue again to link wages with increases in production and restrictive practices that impeded output.²⁴ Robert Taylor argues that the TUC under the influence of the ‘big three’ Arthur Deakin of the TGWU, Wil Lawther of the Mineworkers and Tom Williamson of the General and Municipal Workers (GMWU) were in a dilemma, they chose loyalty to ‘their’ government over the demands of their members.²⁵

However, Booth points out that the TUC were rather more committed to full employment and the restoration of collective bargaining. They promoted greater productivity growth to defend this basic aim, but were kept on the defensive by the Attlee government.²⁶ The unions however adopted a policy of wage restraint, in effect a wage freeze that lasted until the election in 1950. In concluding the agreement between the Labour government and the TUC General Council, the TUC even defied the decision of its Congress.²⁷

Booth has highlighted the glowing reception unions gave the incoming Labour government. The programme of nationalisation, planning and calls for higher productivity in the national interest combined with the wartime shop floor radicalisation suggests Booth, led some unions to reassess

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their role in the ‘new’ society. Where ‘restrictive practices stand in a different light when it is realised that the public interest, along with the workers’ demands... are bound up inseparably with the increase of production per unit of labour.’²⁸ Booth says that the relation slowly wore off. Although, even by 1948 the leader of the largest union, Deakin, told his executive that the unions were vital ‘in developing the new social order’ under the Labour government ‘we must act with wisdom... in a constructive manner’.²⁹

Although trade unions wanted to be consulted and for their views to be considered seriously, a significant weight of opinion believed that involvement in the management of industry was ‘not the function of the Trade Union Movement.’³⁰ Alternatively, as has been mentioned above, communist militants in the workplace had been amongst the keenest to increase output when the Soviet Union required assistance. However, with the advent of the Cold War communist shop stewards shied away from collaboration with the ‘class enemy’ and returned to agitate for workers demands.³¹

Trade Union leaders often found themselves in great difficulty. After-all, they were Janus-faced, one looked to voluntarism and free collective bargaining while the other wanted to help Labour build the new society. Tiratsoo and Tomlinson say that they backed the productivity programme to the hilt until the question of wages and conditions were mentioned. Motion study was acceptable to improve productivity but time study was not because it

impinged on wages. The TUC predicament when combined with employers general hostility produced a powerful brake on the government plan.³²

The dire economic situation combined with labour shortages revived interest in the neglected JPCs as a method of securing higher output and for a number of other reasons that fitted into its vision of a new society.³³ The TUC were very positive supporters of the idea but business was reluctant to allow trade unions back into an area considered management territory. Nevertheless, the government did persuade business to support a voluntary and advisory system, however, elements within the TUC and Labour maintained pressure for a compulsory system.³⁴ Tomlinson asserts that the strongest supporter for productivity consultation within government was Cripps, who by 1948 was economic policy supremo. Cripps crucially opposed compulsion and was particularly interested in the research relating to the psychological approach to workers co-operation.³⁵

Bevin an advocate of JPCs suggested that, ‘men will follow when they know that they are getting a fair deal, and at this time in our development this means that they must be treated as equal partners and must be given the facts.’³⁶ Academic studies suggest that the men did not follow. The government may have been firm advocates of JPCs but trade unions at the grass roots were less enthusiastic than members of the TUC General Council while employers co-operated reluctantly.³⁷ Alan McKinlay has presented contemporaneous evidence from the National Institute of Industrial

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Psychology that showed that joint consultation was likely to work only in situations where trade unions were welcome and allowed shop steward activity. Where employers were hostile to unions, as on Clydeside, the movement failed to gain ground.³⁸

The logical conclusion to consultation in the workplace on production matters would be its extension to other areas of mutual concern involving some form of industrial democracy.³⁹ This may have been the reason why unions and managers were reluctant to tread the path that would require a fundamental shift in British industrial relations to a continental co-determinist position. Alan Fox has argued that for unions a recourse to industrial democracy on the European model would ‘involve them [unions] in accepting and operating a system that assumed their involvement in a works community marked by a joint pursuit with management of efficiency and enterprise well-being.’ Fox argues that such a step was impossible in Britain because of institutional blockages established by both labour and capital.⁴⁰ This appears to be supported by other evidence suggesting that the role of JPCs in Britain was limited to discussion of minor issues, ‘all tea and toilets’ while the TUC were fearful of losing power to the grass roots.⁴¹

The position in the new nationalised industries was slightly different, the Labour government made it compulsory for unions to be consulted. Initially, there was widespread euphoria amongst workers for public ownership, particularly the coal mining industry. The National Coal Board (NCB)

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appointed many trade unionists into industrial relations and personnel positions. The government was so eager to raise production in the mines that South Wales Miners leader and leading Communist, Arthur Horner, was appointed National Coal Production Officer in 1945 during the lead period up to formal nationalisation.⁴² For the left, nationalisation was the answer to improving productivity. In 1948, Bevan thought that coal production had increased because the miners believed they were no longer working for the owners but the nation. ‘The spiritual change among the miners themselves has already saved British industry.’⁴³ This view was not one shared by some miners according to research by Ferdynand Zweig.⁴⁴

Towards the end of the 1940s, as Labour reviewed its policies, the left proposed compulsory Development Councils for each industry to co-ordinate production. The Federation of British Industry (FBI) co-ordinated opposition to even the diluted powers of the Development Councils contained in the Industrial Organisation Bill of 1947.⁴⁵ Although Harold Wilson, President of the Board of Trade preferred his option to appoint Company Directors because it was ‘a duty on private industry to conform to the national interest.’⁴⁶

Alongside the rebirth of JPCs on the domestic front, the Marshall Plan heralded an American inspired programme for raising the awareness of productivity, the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP). Tomlinson has suggested the idea emanated from Cripps and Paul Hoffman

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the US Director of the Marshall Plan.⁴⁷ The AACCP was however not a British response to the problem, it was a requirement of Marshall Aid and generated interest but not universal enthusiasm. The tripartite structure of employers, workers and governments fared better in Europe and became universally accepted and advocated by the ILO while Britain quietly dropped the idea in 1952 when Marshall Aid ended.⁴⁸ British business responded to the American invitation to study US productivity success consenting to the project rather than risk government compulsion while trade unionists welcomed the idea of a trip to North America.⁴⁹ Although the AAPC organised sixty-six missions to investigate a variety of US industries, Tomlinson argues that it achieved very little primarily due to the antipathy of management and Labour’s reluctance to antagonise private industry.⁵⁰ The reports themselves did little to encourage employers, management techniques in Britain were a major source of criticism while restrictive labour practices were largely ignored.⁵¹

The traditions of British business based upon nineteenth century liberal economic assumptions of entrepreneurial freedom were innately hostile to a government pledged to intervention and the ‘establishment of a Socialist Commonwealth.’⁵² The gulf between Labour and employers was wide and filled with mutual suspicion. In 1947, G.D.H. Cole a leading Labour intellectual, suggested that pre-war manufacturers combined with the ‘honeycomb of trade associations’ had protected inefficiency with artificially

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high prices and ‘deliberate restriction of output over a wide range of industries.’⁵³

The literature certainly suggests that industry was negative towards government proposals to improve efficiency. A study by Tiratsoo and Tomlinson catalogues British employers wide ranging opposition to state inspired schemes to improve productivity. None of the proposals received more than cursory endorsement and most were met with hostility. According to their study business first considered that the constraint on productivity was government itself, tax, controls and other policies and not something that could be dealt with at the factory. Second, the whole process was trespassing onto areas of management prerogative, JPCs were the ‘thin end of the wedge of workers control.’⁵⁴ An examination of the engineering industry in Scotland points out that employers were willing to engage in collective bargaining but on no account to cede power and control to shop stewards.⁵⁵ The Engineering Employers Federation (EEF) answered government enquiries by stressing their support for joint consultation and ‘that there was no need for government intervention’. Contrary to the public image, the employers ‘demonstrated a determination to revert to the management autocracy perfected during the inter-war depression.’⁵⁶

Employers barely tolerated the reintroduction of JPCs but Labour’s plans for Industrial Development Councils was perceived to be a socialist step too far and unacceptable to the FBI. One commentator has argued that ‘the whole

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episode represented a complete defeat for the government at the hands of private industry.⁵⁷ Undoubtedly some employers must have feared, and as the TUC had implied in 1944, that government regulation and control was the first step to nationalisation without the physical transfer of ownership.⁵⁸ Employers dreaded that socialism meant precisely ‘carrying the managerial revolution to its logical conclusion.’⁵⁹

The institutional productivity debate in the 1940s was not only a feature of the political agenda but also a subject of contemporaneous academic interest led by Henry Phelps Brown and S.J.Handfield-Jones in the *Oxford Economic Papers*.⁶⁰ It was the duty of the whole community to ensure that industry was modernised and production increased, according to G.D.H.Cole, ‘to see that the productive equipment of every industry is thoroughly up-to-date and maintained in good order.’⁶¹

Substantial improvement in productivity was a crucial factor in Labour’s plans. ‘Industrial efficiency in the service of the nation’ was a goal of industrial policy. The manifesto *Let Us Face the Future* placed such a high emphasis on improving productivity because Labour recognised that its priority social programme could only be afforded with the ‘highest possible industrial efficiency’.⁶² The Labour government however failed to secure the support of manufacturing industry to create a climate of productivity consciousness. Although it is problematic that this would have been possible in the face of strong employer opposition to encroachment onto their

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traditional territory. The Trade Union Congress had been willing partners but the lure of the return to collective bargaining held a stronger attraction. The conditions for a social coalition were not in place to carry out all the modernising reforms that Labour demanded.

Despite the failure of government initiatives, the post-war period was one of relative success with high levels of economic growth and an impressive labour productivity record.⁶³ The Labour government was able to push through some modernisation and productivity grew rapidly from the late 1940s.⁶⁴ Labour’s productivity programme had a powerful political backer, Stafford Cripps, but his overriding view together with his civil servants was that any scheme required voluntary support from both sides of industry.

Joseph Melling has argued that institutional rigidities nurtured the cause of Labour’s policy failure. Employers, unions and government were constrained, hampered by a lack of ‘political imagination.’⁶⁵ As this essay has attempted to demonstrate this statement maybe true of the attitude of employers and unions but not about the government. Industry did not support the Labour government and opposed any encroachment into the workplace. The TUC leadership was full of pious words, unable to come to terms with collective bargaining and aspirations for a planned economy. The government had the best of intentions and there was some relative success but in a democratic society, it attempted persuasion rather than compulsion as the path to higher productivity. The institutional rigidity of labour and capital curtailed

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tripartite progress, the Labour government in the face of other pressing problems did not seek the path of coercion.

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NOTES

¹ Labour party, [Let us face the future](#), Labour party manifesto 1945.

<http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab45.htm>. Accessed 2 March 2002.

² Sam Watson, the leader of the Durham Miners, is the epitome of trade union loyalty to the Labour government said, ‘If I were confronted with the defeat of the Government or the reduction of wages, then I would advocate a reduction of wages to save the Labour Government.’ [Daily Herald](#), 24 February, 1948. Cited in, David Howell, ‘Shut Your Gobl: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, 1945-64,’ in Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy (eds.), [British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics](#), Vol.1, (1999), p.136.

³ Correlli Barnett, [The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation](#), London, (1986), pp.146-148.

⁴ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, [Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51](#), London (1993), pp.21-22.

⁵ Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy, ‘The Post-War Compromise: Mapping Industrial Politics, 1945-64’ in Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy (eds.), [British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics](#), Vol. 1: [The Post-War Compromise 1945-64](#), Aldershot, (1999), p.76.

⁶ Alan Booth, ‘Corporate politics and the quest for productivity: the British TUC and the politics of industrial productivity, 1947-1960,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, [Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century](#), Cheltenham, (1996), p.46.

⁷ Trade Unionists were at first hesitant at involvement in areas considered a management prerogative but after the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 the position of Communist shop stewards led the pressure for greater production. Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, [Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century](#), Cheltenham, (1996), p.27. See also, Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, [Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51](#), London (1993), p.24.

⁸ This was the view of Allan Flanders, see, John Kelly, ‘Social Democracy and Anti-Communism: Allan Flanders and British Industrial Relations in the Early Post-War Period,’ in Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy (eds.), [British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics](#), Vol.1, (1999), p.208.

⁹ Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, [Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century](#), Cheltenham, (1996), p.27.

¹⁰ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, [Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51](#), London (1993), pp.24-25.

¹¹ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, [Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51](#), London (1993), p.29.

¹² Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, [Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century](#), Cheltenham, (1996), p.26.

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¹³ Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), pp.27-28.

¹⁴ Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), p.29.

¹⁵ Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), p.28.

¹⁶ Robert Currie, Industrial Politics, Oxford, (1979), p.157.

¹⁷ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51, London (1993), p.12.

¹⁸ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51, London (1993), pp.14-15.

¹⁹ J.Ramsay MacDonald, Socialism and Society, London, (1905), p.201.

²⁰ Dennis Barnes and Eileen Reid, Governments and Trade Unions, London, (1980), p.13.

²¹ Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy, ‘The Post-War Compromise: Mapping Industrial Politics, 1945-64’, in Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy (eds.), British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics, Vol. 1: The Post-War Compromise 1945-64, Aldershot, (1999), p.77.

²² TUC, Interim Report on the Post-War Reconstruction, (1944), cited in Dennis Barnes and Eileen Reid, Governments and Trade Unions, London, (1980), pp.12-13.

²³ John Campbell, Nye Bevan and the Mirage of British Socialism, London, (1987), p.191.

²⁴ Alan Booth, ‘Corporate politics and the quest for productivity: the British TUC and the politics of industrial productivity, 1947-1960,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), p.48.

²⁵ Robert Taylor, ‘Trade Union Freedom and the Labour Party: Arthur Deakin, Frank Cousins and the Transport and General Workers Union 1945-64,’ in Brian Brivati and Richard Heffernan (eds.), The Labour Party: A Centenary History, Basingstoke, (2000), p.190.

²⁶ Alan Booth, ‘Corporate politics and the quest for productivity: the British TUC and the politics of industrial productivity, 1947-1960,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), p.49.

²⁷ Dennis Barnes and Eileen Reid, Governments and Trade Unions, London, (1980), pp.15-17.

²⁸ AEU Journal, April, (1946), cited in Alan Booth, ‘Corporate politics and the quest for productivity: the British TUC and the politics of industrial productivity, 1947-1960,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), pp.46-47.

²⁹ Arthur Deakin, ‘Quarterly Report to General Executive Council’, August, (1948) cited in Robert Taylor, ‘Trade Union Freedom and the Labour Party: Arthur Deakin, Frank Cousins

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³⁰ Tom Fraser MP and Trade Union official cited in Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51, London (1993), p.53.

³¹ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51, London (1993), p.126.

³² Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51, London (1993), pp.96-97.

³³ Steven Fielding, Peter Thompson and Nick Tiratsoo, England Arise: The Labour Party and popular politics in 1940s Britain, Manchester, (1995), p.112. See also Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), p.31.

³⁴ Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), pp.31-32. See also, Steven Fielding, Peter Thompson and Nick Tiratsoo, England Arise: The Labour Party and popular politics in 1940s Britain, Manchester, (1995), p.113.

³⁵ Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), pp.33-35.

³⁶ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51, London (1993), p.47.

³⁷ Steven Fielding, Peter Thompson and Nick Tiratsoo, England Arise: The Labour Party and popular politics in 1940s Britain, Manchester, (1995), pp.113-116. See also, Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), p.36.

³⁸ Alan McKinlay, ‘Management and workplace trade unionism: Clydeside engineering, 1945-1957,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), pp.177-178.

³⁹ Jim Tomlinson, ‘Productivity, joint consultation and human relations in post-war Britain: the Attlee Government and the workplace,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century, Cheltenham, (1996), p.33.

⁴⁰ Alan Fox, ‘Corporatism and Industrial Democracy: The Social Origins of Present Forms and Methods in Britain and Germany’, in Social Science Research Council, Industrial Democracy: International Views, Warwick, (1978), pp.20-21 and 32.

⁴¹ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51, London (1993), pp.105-106.

⁴² Hywel Francis and David Smith, The Fed: A History of the South Wales Miners in the Twentieth Century, London, (1980), p.435.

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⁴³ Nye Bevan speech to 1948 Labour party conference cited in John Campbell, [Nye Bevan and the Mirage of British Socialism](#), London, (1987), p.191.

⁴⁴ Steven Fielding, Peter Thompson and Nick Tiratsoo, [England Arise: The Labour Party and popular politics in 1940s Britain](#), Manchester, (1995), p.117.

⁴⁵ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, [Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51](#), London (1993), pp.82-84.

⁴⁶ Ben Pimlott, [Harold Wilson](#), London, (1992), p.130. A similar view was held by G.D.H.Cole who suggested that private industry had to operate in the public interest by maximising production. See, G.D.H.Cole, [The Intelligent Man’s Guide to the post-war World](#), London, (1947), p.182.

⁴⁷ Jim Tomlinson, ‘The failure of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity’, [Business History](#), Vol.33, No.1, (1991), p.83.

⁴⁸ Joseph Prokopenko, [Productivity promotion organisations: evolution and experience](#), International Labour Office: PMD/1/E, April (1999).
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/ent/papers/np0.htm> [Accessed 4 March 2002]

⁴⁹ Jim Tomlinson, ‘The failure of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity’, [Business History](#), Vol.33, No.1, (1991), pp.82-83 and 89.

⁵⁰ Jim Tomlinson, ‘The failure of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity’, [Business History](#), Vol.33, No.1, (1991), p.89.

⁵¹ Jim Tomlinson, ‘The failure of the Anglo-American Council on Productivity’, [Business History](#), Vol.33, No.1, (1991), p.85.

⁵² Eric Shaw, [The Labour Party since 1945](#), Oxford, (1996), p.31. The Labour party manifesto stated. ‘The Labour Party is a Socialist Party, and proud of it. Its ultimate purpose at home is the establishment of the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain’. See, Labour party, [Let us face the future](#), Labour party manifesto 1945.
<http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab45.htm>. [Accessed 2 March 2002].

⁵³ G.D.H.Cole, [The Intelligent Man’s Guide to the post-war World](#), London, (1947), pp.493-494.

⁵⁴ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, [Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51](#), London (1993), p.95.

⁵⁵ Alan McKinlay and Joseph Melling, ‘The Shop Floor Politics of Productivity: Work, Power and Authority Relations in British Engineering, c.1945-57,’ in Alan Campbell, Nina Fishman and John McIlroy (eds.), [British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics](#), Vol.1, (1999), p.226.

⁵⁶ Alan McKinlay, ‘Management and workplace trade unionism: Clydeside engineering, 1945-1957,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, [Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century](#), Cheltenham, (1996), p.177.

⁵⁷ H. Mercer, ‘The Labour Government and Private Industry,’ in N.Tiratsoo (ed.), [The Attlee Years](#), London, (1993), pp.81-83.

⁵⁸ Robert Currie, [Industrial Politics](#), Oxford, (1979), p.159.

⁵⁹ Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, [Industrial efficiency and state interventions: Labour 1939-51](#), London (1993), p.49.

⁶⁰ The post-war debate on the origins of the productivity ‘problem’ cited in Michael Dintenfass, ‘Converging accounts, misleading metaphors and persistent doubts’ in Jean-

“The failure of the Government’s post-war productivity programme can be laid at the door of the Trades Union Congress and the union movement in general.” Assess this statement in the light of your reading of the Labour Government’s relationship with the trade unions and the employers.

Pierre Dormois and Michael Dintenfass (eds.), [The British Industrial Decline](#), London, (1999), p.11.

⁶¹ G.D.H.Cole, [The Intelligent Man’s Guide to the post-war World](#), London, (1947), p.180.

⁶² Labour party, [Let us face the future](#), Labour party manifesto 1945.

<http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab45.htm>. [Accessed 2 March 2002].

‘But great national programmes of education, health and social services are costly things. Only an efficient and prosperous nation can afford them in full measure. If, unhappily, bad times were to come, and our opponents were in power, then, running true to form, they would be likely to cut these social provisions on the plea that the nation could not meet the cost. That was the line they adopted on at least three occasions between the wars. There is no good reason why Britain should not afford such programmes, but she will need full employment and the highest possible industrial efficiency in order to do so.’

⁶³ Charles Feinstein, ‘Introduction’, in Charles Feinstein (ed.), [The Managed Economy: Essays in British Economic Policy and Performance since 1929](#), Oxford, (1983), p5.

⁶⁴ Bernard Alford, ‘1945-51: years of recovery or a stage in economic decline?’ in Clive Trebilcock and Peter Clarke (eds.), [Understanding Decline](#), Cambridge, (1998), pp.186-211. Cited in Jim Tomlinson, ‘Labour and the economy’, in Duncan Tanner, Pat Thane and Nick Tiratsoo (eds.), [Labour’s First Century](#), Cambridge, (2000), p.59.

⁶⁵ Joseph Melling, ‘Management, labour and the politics of productivity: strategies and struggles in Britain, Germany and Sweden,’ in Joseph Melling and Alan McKinlay, [Management, labour and industrial politics in modern Europe: The quest for productivity growth during the Twentieth Century](#), Cheltenham, (1996), p.10.

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